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Less Law, but More Justice?: Jury Trials and Mediation as
Means of Resolving Will Contests
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"In vain thy reason finer webs shall draw,
Entangle justice in her net of law."
Alexander Pope, Epistle 3, 1.191(1733)
"It becomes a wise man to try everything
he can do by words, before having to resort
to arms."
Terence, EUNUCHUS, iv., 7,19.
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Chester is the author of the award winning book INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY (1982)
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American law schools. The author would like to thank Tracey Bulger, Shoshanna Chaiton,
Kathryn Colson, and particularly Lara Zdravecky for their valuable assistance on this project.
Finally, he would like to thank the James R. Lawton Summer Stipend Program for funding the
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is not surprising that positive law is often viewed as detached from
justice. Whatever its original intention, law as promulgated by the le-
gally-trained mind often conflicts with the layman's sense of equity or
fairness or, as Charles Dickens put it "If the law supposes that..., the
law is an ass - 'an idiot."'1
These sentiments have, in part, led to the recent emphasis on alter-
native dispute resolution, as a better choice than litigation in many situa-
tions. An interesting philosophical question is raised as to whether law-
training tends to crowd out the general sense of justice held by human
beings. If so, lawyers and judges may be seen as poor resolvers of conflict
as compared to lay mediators, or even lay juries.
One area that particularly strikes me as fertile for examining lay jus-
tice is that of will contests, which often focus on two questions that the
law itself finds difficult: (1) how much influence on a testator is undue,
and (2) how mentally infirm must a testator be to be unable to leave a
proper will? At first blush, these questions seem well suited to the process
of mediation. Furthermore, given the highly emotional nature of these
diverse family issues, such mediation might be better handled, if not by
lay people, then at least by non-lawyers who possess some psychological
training.
Will contests based on American common law doctrines such as
undue influence and testamentary incapacity offer indirect, imperfect
protection for those who would otherwise be disinherited? Faulty execu-
tion of the will or fraud may also be a ground for such contests?
Will contests are rare events in the probate of wills, but are none-
theless events of considerable importance due to the corrosive effect on
families that often attends them.4 While the law of will contests focuses
on ensuring that the true intent of the testator is carried out,5 the reality
1. CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 462 (Penguin Books USA Inc. ed. 1961) (1867).
2. See Ronald Chester, Disinheritance and the American Child: An Alternative from British
Columbia, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) [hereinafter Disinheritance]. See also Ronald Chester,
Should American Children be Protected Against Disinheritance?, 32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
405, 407 (1997) [hereinafter American Children].
3. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 145-96
(5th ed. 1995) (discussing and presenting cases involving these doctrines).
4. See Jeffrey P. Rosenfeld, Will Contests: Legacies of Aging and Social Change, in
INHERITANCE AND WEALTH IN AMERICA 173, 174 (Robert K. Miller, Jr. & Stephen J.
McNamee eds., Plenum Press 1998).
5. See generally Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235
(1996).
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of such contests generally centers on which members of the affected fam-
ily are to receive property from the estate. This latter orientation is par-
ticularly noticeable when the contest is settled by the parties or is decided
by a jury. By contrast, judges, sitting without a jury, tend to rule in favor
of the will proponents due in part to their attempts to uphold the testa-
tor's intent.
6
In a will contest, the will is presumed to be legitimate if the propo-
nent proves that the execution of the will was in compliance with appli-
cable statutory requirements.7 The contestant, on the other hand, has
the ultimate burden of proof on the issue of the will's legitimacy! The
contestant attempts to prove the grounds of his or her contest, often re-
lying on the doctrines of undue influence or lack of testamentary capac-
ity.9 In Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum's Tennessee study of will contests,
for example, testamentary capacity and undue influence accounted for
the exclusive grounds of contest in 39 of 60 cases in which the allegations
could be determined."0 When fraud and forgery were alleged, they were
always joined with counts of undue influence and lack of testamentary
capacity.1 Cases involving these two doctrines will thus be the primary
focus of our inquiry.
Because the doctrines of undue influence and lack of testamentary
capacity both involve some degree of mental weakness in the testator,
courts often consider their elements together, even though each theory
involves a separate and distinct test.2 To this end, courts employ the
"will substitution test" as the general standard for undue influence. In
applying this test, a court questions whether the testator's mind was cn-
trolled by another person to such an extent that his will is in effect the
will of that other person.'3 To show that the testator's mind was under
such influence, the "will substitution test" requires the contestant to
prove the following four elements: opportunity, naturalness of dispoi.
6. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 158 and text accompanying notes 31-33,
infra.
7. See Kathryn Sampson, Burden Shifting in Will Contest Cases: An Examination and a Pro-
posal that the Arkansas Supreme Court Reconcile Arkansas Rules of Evidence Rule 301 with its Undue
Influence Case Law, 1996 ARK. L. NOTES 93, 94 (1996).
8. See id.
9. See Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests-An Empirical Study, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 607, 647 (1987).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See Sampson, supra note 7, at 94.
13. See Trent J. Thornley, The Caring Influence: Beyond Autonomy as the Foundation of Undue
Influence, 71 IND. L.J. 513, 517 (1996).
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tion, motive and susceptibility. 14
As for testamentary capacity, the testator must have, at the time of
the execution of the will, the capacity to know and understand: (1) the
nature of his act; (2) the nature and extent of his property; and (3) his
relation to those persons who are the natural objects of his bounty.
Professor Milton D. Green suggests that the standard of testamentary
capacity is not revealed in the test created by the courts, but is rather to
be found in an inarticulate standard, applied by the juries-the fairness of
the will. 6 Although one might take the view that judges use wide "equi-
table" discretion in a manner similar to that of juries, I am inclined to
agree with Professor Green's opinion that appeals to fairness, rather than
to positive law, are more likely to emanate from the jury room than from
the bench.
It is a thesis of this article that, despite the common law focus on the
mind of the testator, the proper inquiry in will contests goes to the fair-
ness of the resulting distribution, particularly as it affects children. This
inquiry is. directly in line with that undertaken in systems such as that in
British Columbia' s and is already present to some extent in the American
system, at least when disposition of the contest is by settlement or jury
verdict. The inquiry, however, does run against the grain of American
jurisprudence, if not always against American practice itself.9 Despite the
fact that the right to contest a will before a jury has recently been elimi-
nated in states such as California0 and Massachusetts,2 I argue for in-
14. See id. at 518. Opposing this standard, Thornley proposes the following undue influence
standard: First, was the testator autonomous? And second, if the testator was not fully autono-
mous, was the relationship between the testator and the influencer a caring one? Id. at 541.
Thornley concludes that "only when a Court or a jury finds a negative answer to both of these
inquiries should it issue a judgment of undue influence." Id.
15. Michael Falkner, Comments: A Case Against Admitting into Evidence the Dispositive Ele-
ments of a Will in a Contested Based on Testamentary Incapacity, 2 CONN. L. REV. 616, 617
(1970). See also Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Prem-
ise, 53 YALE L.J. 271, 311 (1944).
16. See Falkner, supra note 15, at 621. A conflict arises between the "fairness test" and the
"judicial test": "The 'fairness' spoken of here is generally predicated on the belief that the con-
testant's share should be commensurate with the closeness of his blood relation to the testator
and proportionate to 'natural' (i.e. orthodox) estate divisions." Id. The fairness test is in abro-
gation of the judicial test, the purpose of which is to determine whether the testator has the
capacity to comprehend his actions. Id.
17. See infra text accompanying note 67.
18. See generally Chester, supra note 2 (both articles cited therein).
19. Cf. Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN L. REV. 571, 576-577 (1997)
(expressing disapproval of the doctrine of undue influence when such doctrine is used to upset
testator's intent).
20; CAL PROB. CODE § 7200 (West 1991).
21. MASS. STAT. ch. 211 (1986) (repealing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 215, § 16 (1986)).
Vol. 3 7:173
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creased use of jury trials in such contests. However, the primary emphasis
of this article is on family reconciliation, which may or may not follow a
jury verdict; this reconciliation seems to be a goal best reached through
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"), particularly mediation]2
The argument's chief thrust is as follows: First, the inquiry into the
dead testator's true state of mind at the time of testation is necessarily
fraught with uncertainty.23 Second, such an undertaking, even if "suc-
cessful," gives the dead hand of the testator control over the needs and
rights of the living,' especially living children: it sacrifices family protec-
tion and unduly favors the romantic notion of "free" testation. Third,
family protection should be direct via statute, as in British Columbia's
Wills Variation Act,26 not indirect, as in America's use of undue influ-
ence and its kin.2" Fourth, because the enactment of a statute preventing
disinheritance of children may prove impossible, at least in the short
term, in the United States, the courts should emphasize family protection
and fairness when confronted with common law will contests. Fifth,
such an emphasis is best achieved by mediated settlements arrived at by
the parties within a framework that ensures the right to a jury trial if me-
diation proves unsuccessful.2 9
The repealed provisions had allowed parties in a will contest to request that the probate judge
frame issues for jury trial in a probate matter. If the probate judge granted the parties' request,
the issues were tried by jury in the superior court. With the repeal of this statute, parties no
longer have the right to request a trial by jury in the courts of Massachusetts. See also
MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE: PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE, WITH FORMS § 23.7 (1997).
22. Telephone Interview with David A. Dorfman, New York City Attorney (uly 7, 1998)
[hereinafter Dorfman Interview].
23. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 145-97. See generally C.P. SNOW, IN
THEIR WISDOM 119-123 (1974) (discussing the difficulty of proving the state of mind of the
testator with regard to undue influence).
24. See LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 139 (1955).
25. See Deborah A. Batts, I Didn't Ask To Be Born: The American Law of Disinheritance and a
Proposal for Change to a System of Protected Disinheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197, 1197-98, 1269
(1990).
26. See Wills Variation Act, R.S.B.C., ch. 435 § 2(1) (1979) (Can.).
27. See Disinheritance, supra note 2, at 28-30.
28. Id. at 34-35; but cf. Madoff, supra note 19, at 619-20 (arguing that undue influence al-
ready provides some protection against disinheritance, but that the doctrine should be purified
so that it protects the dead testator's true intent, rather than disinherited family members).
29. Lara Zdravecky, Research in the Fulton County, Georgia, Probate Court, July, 1998
[hereinafter Fulton County Probate Court Research]. The probate courts of Fulton County
Georgia afford litigants the right to a jury trial, upon formal request by the parties. However,
before a case may go to trial, Fulton County requires all probate cases, such as will contests, to
be submitted to mediation first, unless the attorneys can convince the judge otherwise (which is
an extremely rare occasion). If mediation does not work for the parties, they may return to
court and proceed with a full evidentiary trial, whether it be by jury or by bench. Fulton County
experiences, roughly, a 65% success rate with mediation, and its courts hear only a couple of jury
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 37:173
II. RESEARCH RESULTS IN MASSACHUSETTS AND GEORGIA
A. Judges versus Juries as Decision Makers in Will Contests
This article presents research conducted in several probate systems
nationwide. At the outset, it must be recognized that such research is
often next to impossible in antiquated, uncomputerized probate systems
such as those in Massachusetts and New York.?' The data we gathered in
Suffolk County, Massachusetts was in fact gathered for one of my assis-
tants by a court employee, Genevieve Donnelly, who happened to be
keeping a list on intake of those matters which were contested. We were
not so lucky in other Massachusetts counties or in New York. In contrast,
data collection was relatively easy in Fulton County (Atlanta) Georgia,
whose system we view as the prototype for our recommendations.
In Suffolk County, as in the rest of Massachusetts, no jury trial can
be had for will contests.3" In this environment, all such cases from 1995
to 1997 that were decided by judges were resolved in favor of the will
proponents.3 2 Research in Davidson County, Tennessee, where jury tni-
als may be used as an alternative to judicial decision making, revealed
that ten of twelve will contests before a judge were resolved in favor of
trials per year. The sample gathered in the summer of 1998 by Lara Zdravecky, a research assis-
tant on location in Fulton County, Georgia, for the years 1995 to 1997, revealed four requests
for a jury trial. Of the four requests, two of the cases were settled during mediation, while the
remaining two cases were determined by jury trial. The Senior Attorney for Fulton County
Probate Court expressed the department's enthusiasm and pride in the success of their media-
tion program. Of course, trial by jury, or before the bench, is always available in the event that
the mediation program is deemed unsatisfactory by the parties involved in the dispute.
30. Telephone Interview with Saul Gerstenfeld, Clerk of Courts, King's County Probate
Court, Brooklyn, N.Y. (July 8, 1998) (characterization of New York's surrogate courts is that of
Mr. Gerstenfeld. The Massachusetts characterization is that of the author).
31. See supra text accompanying note 21.
32. Research by research assistant Tracey Bulger pursuant to an interview with Genevieve
Donnelly by Tracey Bulger, Suffolk County Probate Court, in Boston Massachusetts (March,
1998) [hereinafter Suffolk County Probate Court Research]. Ms. Bulger took a sample of will
contests in Suffolk County, Boston, Massachusetts from the years 1995 through 1997. A total of
38 cases were gathered and analyzed. Nine cases were presided over by a judge and all 9 of the
38 cases were decided for the proponent. Nineteen of the cases were settled outside of court.
The remaining cases from the sample included four cases that ended in compromise verdicts
rendered by the judge, two that were dismissed for procedural reasons, and four cases that were
withdrawn before a decision or settlement could be reached. From this sample it could be con-
cluded that a will contestant is not likely to win in Suffolk County Probate Court if he or she
fails to reach a settlement and tries the case before a judge.
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the proponent, but just seven of twelve before a jury were resolved in
favor of the proponent.3
The wills contested in Davidson County ordinarily did not involve
huge fortunes--the average value of the contested estate was
$95,906.00. The median value was $54,867.53. There was no correla-
tion between size of the estate and the likelihood of contest. In all, there
were sixty-six wills contested during the nine-year period of the study; of
these, only twenty-four actually proceeded to judgment or verdict, of
which twelve were decided by a judge and twelve by a jury. As previously
indicated, five of twelve jury verdicts were for the contestant, as were two
of the twelve judgments of the court. Thus, while juries showed only a
slight bias in favor of proponents, judges held decidedly in their favor.
These results suggest that while it is more likely that the judge will find
for the proponent, the converse-that a jury will automatically find for
the contestant- is not true. One view of these results is that the poten-
tial in Davidson County of choosing a jury rather than a judge may give
33. See Schoenblum, supra note 9, at 626-27. The predominant contestants in this nine-year
study were children, siblings, nieces and nephews, grandchildren and "lawful heirs," or "next of
kin." Id. at 636-40 tbls.15, 16, 17. A substantial number of cases involved efforts by family
members to prevent the distribution of property to outsiders in addition to traditional intra-
family disputes. Id. at 632-34. However, there was not a single case during the nine-year period
of study in which a child of the testator mounted a truly successful contest against siblings. Id. at
641 n.88.
Another study concluded that approximately 75% of all will contests heard by a California
jury were successful. Note, Will Contests on Trial, 6 STAN. L REV. 91, 92 (1953). The Note'
reported that "[olf the 220 cases examined, 116 reached the jury, resulting in 99(77%) verdicts
for the contestant." Id. at 92 n.5. However, this figure is unsupported by the findings of Jeffrey
Schoenblum. See Schoenblum, supra note 9. He analyzed the results of will contests in Nash-
ville, Tennessee, over a nine-year period. Id. at 608-11. Schoenblum determined that in David-
son County for
1984, there were a total of 4,270 deaths. Yet, the number of wills filed for pro-
bate with the Clerk of the Probate Court was only 971 . . .this represents only
22.4 % of total deaths in the county... [t]hese results suggest that the probate
process has played no role in the transmission of the wealth by the majority of
decedents in Davidson County.
Id. at 611.
Schoenblum noted that in no year during the nine-year period did the number of contests
exceed 1.244% of all probates. This figure is set against the already low number of wills that
were entered into probate. Id. at 612 The author suggests five reasons why the figure is so low,
including: (1) minors/incompetents are not capable of making wills; (2) not all wills are submit-
ted for probate; (3) decedents who die late in one year may not have had their will offered for
probate until the following year (although any loss at the end of one year should have been
made up, at least in part at the beginning of the next year, but the figure remains the same on
average per year); (4) the use of will substitutes, such as joint tenancies and revocable trusts;
and (5) persons die without estates consisting of sufficient assets to require probate. The two
main reasons for the low number of contests are few disgruntled parties and the high attendant
cost to litigate. See id. at 616.
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the contestant at least some chance to win before a judge,34 whereas, in
Suffolk County, Massachusetts, there appears to be virtually no such
chance.35 In addition, the Davidson County contestants had close to a
fifty percent chance of winning when the jury trial option was chosen.
Thus, the results indicate that the contestants' overall chances of a fa-
vorable decision are much greater in Davidson County, Tennessee, than
in Suffolk County, Massachusetts.
In examining these limited findings for purposes of this article, a m-
tionwide study was conducted of will contests based on undue influence
or lack of testamentary capacity whose appeals were reported from Feb-
ruary 3, 1997 to January 27, 1998. It revealed that only eight of the wills
contested during this period had been decided by juries at the trial court
level.36 All eight of the judgments in the lower court were affirmed by the
appellate court. Five judgments were for contestants and two were for
proponents. The eighth appeal was from a judge's decision overturning a
jury verdict for the contestant. This judgment was affirmed for the pro-
ponent.37
A markedly different pattern emerged from judge-tried cases. Of the
twenty-two cases involving undue influence and lack of testamentary
capacity, only five were originally decided for the contestant. Of these,
two were reversed for the proponent and three were affirmed. Perhaps
the most striking finding, however, was that seven cases originally de-
cided by a judge in favor of the proponent were reversed by the appellate
court.
38
Ultimately, contestants won in ten of twenty-two cases (although the
outcomes of the seven reversals once they were retried are unclear); only
34. See id.
35. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
36. The study, by research assistant Kathryn Colson, [hereinafter Appellate Court Research]
found that of 22 bench trials which went to the appellate level, 12 cases were ultimately decided
for the proponent and the remaining 10 in favor of the contestant. Of the 12 for the proponent,
ten were affirmed decisions (from trials in New York (2), South Carolina, Virginia, Oklahoma
(2), North Dakota, Kansas, and Georgia (2)); only two were reversals of the lower court's deci-
sion for the contestant (New York and Florida). Of the 10 appeals which were decided in favor
of the contestant, only three decisions were affirmed (from New Hampshire, Louisiana, and New
York) and the other seven appeals were reversals of a lower court ruling for proponent (from
Alabama, Texas, Massachusetts, Florida, Kentucky, Illinois, and Arizona). The study also re-
vealed that, of seven jury trials that had gone to the appellate courts concerning the issues of
undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity, two of the appeals were decided in favor of
the proponent, (one was an affirmed decision, and the other was a reversal). The remaining five
cases were decided in favor of the contestant, (three affirmed the decisions of the lower court
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three of these ten judgments were originally made by the probate judge
and then affirmed. 9
In summary, when before a judge at the trial level, the contestant
prevailed only five of twenty-two times; if the contestant went before a
jury, the contestant prevailed six of eight times (although one of these
verdicts was overturned by a judge as unsustainable at law)
One might even conclude that the observed bias of probate judges
against contestants is so remarkable that the appellate courts have in
many cases decided to step in and overturn the decisions of probate
judges: of the seventeen cases originally decided by the judge for the pro-
ponent, seven were overturned at the appellate level.'
In litigated cases, the stunning bias of judges, as opposed to jurors, in
favor of proponents tends to mask the fact that contestants appearing
before judges often "win" settlements. For example, the Suffolk County
research did indicate that a number of contests before a judge were set-
tled by the parties, and that the contestants received substantial portions
of the estates involved.42
One question that arises is why proponents in Suffolk County are
settling with contestants when they will almost surely win if they were to
litigate before judges. There are a number of possible answers. First, pro-
ponents may not know that they will almost surely win before judges;
second, they may want to settle anyway in the interest of family harmony
or tQ avoid the expense and delay of trial. Finally, it is possible that the
cases settling are generally the strong contestants' cases: that is, if these
cases went to trial, many of them might be decided in the contestants'
favor, even by a judge.
B. The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Will Contests
If a significant number of contests are being settled, even under a
Massachusetts system that does not provide for jury trials, why should we
worry about instituting ADR? In a recent unpublished paper, one scholar
who takes a neutral position as to ADR suggests the following reason:
settlement may not equal reconciliation or true resolution of the
conflict.43 In this view, party-driven settlement (often negotiated by law-
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See Appellate Court Research, supra note 36.
42. See Suffolk County Probate Court Research, supra note 32.
43. See generally Lea Hunsicker Macchi, The Morality of ADR: Does It Exist? (1997) (un-
published manuscript, on file with the author).
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yers) may satisfy the court but, because it is arrived at without the assis-
tance of a neutral party to level the playing field, it may also reflect un-
derlying power disparities between the parties and may not truly reconcile
the members of the families that are involved in the will contest."
Even if we lack hard evidence that more equitable resolutions are
generally reached through mediation than through traditional two-party
bargaining generally, mediation remains less expensive and easier to im-
plement than are the alternatives. When mediation is used, resolution of
a dispute can often be reached in a single session. The Fulton County
Probate Court in Atlanta believes so strongly in the superiority of settle-
ments under ADR that it refers virtually all will contests immediately to
mediation.45 Against a backdrop where either judicial or jury decision
making is available when mediation fails, Fulton County reports a sixty-
five percent success rate in mediating settlements of all contested mat-
ters."4
In my view, the necessary climate for mediation settlements is
achieved in a system that affords the contestant the right to a jury trial4
If parties know that in jurisdictions with no jury trial contestants are tn-
likely to win a litigated contest, the relative strength of their bargaining
positions will be affected. An experienced estate litigator in New York
City shared what he thought were even more important reasons: cost and
44. See id.
45. See Fulton County Probate Court Research, supra note 29. The Fulton County Probate
Court initially refers all of its cases to mediation, unless the attorneys can convince the judge
otherwise. Rarely do the attorneys try and, if they do, even more rarely do they succeed in con-
vincing the judge that the case should go directly to trial. The parties are not required to reach
a decision or agreement in mediation. A trial is always available if mediation fails.
46. Interview by Lara Zdravecky with Barbara Koll, Senior Attorney of Fulton County Pro-
bate Court, in Atlanta, Ga. (July 1, 1998) [hereinafter Koll Interview]. Zdravecky took a sample
of 36 cases involving will contests filed in the Fulton County Probate Court between 1995 and
1997. In each case, issues of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity were present.
Of the total 36 cases involving undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity, 24 were
settled in mediation, producing a 67% success rate for mediation of these types of disputes. The
remaining 12 cases went to trial after mediation proved to be unsuccessful. Ten of these cases
were decided by a judge (eight for the proponent; one for the contestant; and one, which was a
modification of the will, a compromise) and the last two cases were decided by a jury (both cases
were decided for the contestant). The 65% success rate, referred to by Barbara Koll, was the
product of all of the matters that came before the probate court in the same time period. See
Fulton County Probate Court Research, supra note 29. In addition to the cases of undue influ-
ence and lack of testamentary capacity, which Lara Zdravecky researched, Barbara Koll's statis-
tics included matters such as fraud, faulty execution, guardianships, and spousal annual support.
See id.
47. See Koll Interview, supra note 46. Of the 12 Fulton County cases that mediation failed to
settle, the two cases presented to a jury were decided in the contestants' favor. In contrast,
eight of the ten cases presented before a judge were decided for the proponents.
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delay. He argued that settlements become increasingly easier to reach as
the costs of alternatives escalate. Although a trial before a judge is costly,
involves delay, and can provide incentives for both sides to settle, a trial
by jury is even more expensive and time consuming. This attorney sees
the right to a jury trial in New York as important in fostering settlements,
even if these settlements are reached for the "wrong" reasons.
When questioned, the attorney made clear he would much prefer
the Atlanta system of virtually automatic mediation to the New York
system. Again, the main reason aside from better settlements was the
avoidance of high cost and delay. The New York Attorney believed that
the Atlanta system would provide less expensive, quicker, and better re-
sults than does the New York system.49 I agree and, therefore, view the
Fulton County system as the prototype for American probate courts han-
dling will contests,
III. TRIAL BY JURY IN WILL CONTESTS: CONTRASTS WITH
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING NATIONWIDE
Shortly after California repealed the right to jury trial in will con-
tests,50 Massachusetts followed suit.51 In California, the primary reasons
for the change seemed to involve judicial economy. The California Law
Review Commission complained that too many jury verdicts were being
decided for contestants and that many of these decisions were later being
reversed on appeal.52 Because at early common law will contests involv-
ing realty were tried by jury but those involving personalty were not, his-
tory provided no clear guide as to what modem probate systems, which
try both types of cases, should do.53 Furthermore, state constitutions in
general provided no such right to a jury.54 Therefore a system that re-
duced costs and delay seemed to make sense.
A study of which states permit jury trials in will contests was under-
48. See Dorfman Interview, supra note 22.
49. Id.
50. CAL. PROB. CODE § 7200 (West 1991).
51. See supra note 21.
52. See Recommendation Relating to Opening Estate Administration, 19 CAL. L. REvISION
COMMISSION REP. 787, 793 (1988); See also DUKEMINIER & JOHNSON, supra note 3, at 157-58.
53. Josef Athanas, Comment, The Pros and Cons of Jury Trials in Will Contests, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 529, 532 (1990).
54. See id. Will contests are tried in state courts, and the Seventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which guaranteed the right to a jury trial in certain civil cases, has not been
extended to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. See id.
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taken by a student commentator, Josef Athanas, in 1990." According to
Athanas, seven states specifically deny jury trials in will contests!6 Mas-
sachusetts must be added to this list.57 The majority of states have stat-
utes controlling whether there is a right to a jury trial in will contests.5"
These statutes range from provisions granting a waivable right to jury
trials to those denying jury trials altogether 9 Although most states have
decided that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in will contests,
two states-Indiana and North Carolina--have found such a right at
common law.' Nine other states take the opposite approach, finding that
common law does not dictate a right to a jury trial in will contest pro-
ceedings.6! However, in three of these states--Delaware, Ohio, and Wis-
consin-it is within the discretion of the judge hearing the will contest to
convene a jury. Therefore, despite their common law traditions of deny-
ing an absolute right to a trial by jury, it is evident that these three states
are reluctant to abandon completely the use of juries in will contests 2
55. See generally id. Although it is possible that states have changed their position on jury
trials in will contests since Athanas' compilation, I believe the study is recent enough that any
changes would be minor, if they exist at all.
56. See id. at 540. According to Athanas, the following states do not permit trial by jury in
will contests: Arkansas; California; Louisiana; Oregon; South Dakota; Maine; and Kansas.
57. See supra note 21.
58. See id.
59. See Athanas, supra note 53, at 538. Fifteen states have statutes under which the right to
a jury trial must be asserted in the first pleading; otherwise the right is waived. See id. (Alabama,
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming, and North Dakota). Two states, Montana and Nevada, have
statutes granting a jury trial in a will contest when one of the parties requests it. In these states,
however, the jury is required to return a special verdict. See id. In Alaska, Arizona, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania, the permissibility of a jury trial in a will contest is
within the judge's discretion. See id. In these states, a court may use its discretion to convene an
advisory jury for the determination of any issue of fact in cases where there is no constitutional
right to a jury trial. See id. In Kentucky, the court, on its own initiative, may try an issue with an
advisory jury. See id. Judges, in Oklahoma and Pennsylvania, may impanel an advisory jury. Id.
Colorado, Hawaii, New Mexico, New York, South Carolina, and Utah enacted statutes which
grant the right to a trial by jury in a will contest if the parties demand such a trial. Notwith-
standing the parties' waiver of the right to jury trial, the courts in these states are still permitted
to empanel an advisory jury. See id.
60. See id at 536. On June 18, 1952, the Indiana Supreme Court created a common law right
to a jury trial in will contests although a statutory right to a jury trial for will contests no longer
existed in that state. North Carolina common law makes a jury trial mandatory for will contests.
Jury trials may not be waived because the state considers all will contests in rem proceedings,
holding that since the contestant and the devisee are not actually parties to the proceeding, they
cannot by consent relieve the judge of his duty to submit the issue to a jury. See id.
61. See id. at 537. These states are Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Ohio, New Jersey,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. See id.
62. See id at 541. According to Athanas, 13 states do not use juries at all when deciding will
contests. Thirty-seven states occasionally use some form of jury trials when deciding will con-
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Furthermore, although there may not be a fundamental state constitu-
tional right to a jury trial, even courts that do not hear full-blown jury
trials may be empowered to convene an advisory jury!'
Athanas suggests that a determination as to whether there should be
a right to a jury trial of will contests must rest on some basis other than
history.' In addition, he argues against the use of jury trials in probate
proceedings.65 Athanas is concerned that jury trials result in the surren-
der of juries to their emotions in rendering verdicts. Essentially, this same
argument is relied on by a number of other writers to support the use of
the jury trial; however, such writers generally see the use of juries as in-
volving a sense of equity rather than emotion.' Some argue that juries
may be acting properly when they decide will contests based on their
sense of equity, rather than based on the law, because common sense is
likely to lead them to the right result in cases of this nature.67 Juries have
the ability to focus and reason by looking at the facts, specific circum-
stances, and issues particular to each case. Hence, the crux of the issue in
will contests may be whether it is better to have a jury trial than a bench
trial because the jury might be more concerned with equity than with law
and, therefore, render more judgments that are favorable to the contest-
ant.
The disparity between judge and jury verdicts in will contests has
much to do with the reality of the probate courts themselves. Probate
judges, on the whole, have a vested interest in moving cases along; they
want probate administrations to go smoothly and without unnecessary
tests. There are four basic approaches to the use of jury trials in will contests: "(1) not using
juries at all; (2) using advisory juries; (3) using juries that may render only special verdicts; and
(4) granting a right to jury trials." Id. (With the addition of Massachusetts to the list of states
that do not use juries, the numbers of states cited by Athanas should be revised to 14 and 36,
respectively. See supra note 21.)
63. See Athanas, supra note 53, at 534, 539.
64. See id. at 535.
65. See id. at 541. The commentator argues against the use of jury trials in will contests for
four reasons: (1) jury trials are more time consuming than are bench trials; (2) jury trials are less
"legally fair" than are bench trials because juries are more likely to reach a verdict contrary to
the law, by applying their own sense of justice; (3) lay juries are limited in their understanding of
the issues involved; and (4) juries are vulnerable to the emotions that pervade will con-
tests-they often base verdicts on their impressions .of the contestant and the devisee, rather
than on the testator's will. See id.
66. See id. at 550-53. Arguments in support of jury trials in will contests include the follow-
ing: (1) jury trials are more equitable than bench trials because jurors decide cases using their
common sense ideas of justice, rather than rigidly applying the law; and (2) jury trials of will
contests add legitimacy to the legal system by fostering community participation in the resolu-
tion of legal disputes. Id.
67. See id. at 550.
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delay.6" On the whole, neither they nor the bar that appears before them
are accustomed to jury trials.69 Probate judges are accustomed to exer-
cising broad discretion in probate matters of all kinds. They have a vested
interest in protecting a testator's will and probably feel that, if a contest
must be had, they will be better at determining whether undue influence
or incapacity exists than will a jury. Jury trials involve delay and intro-
duce an "equitable" element that probate judges, even if they feel they
can also exercise it, typically reserve for themselves!'
In reality, the law of undue influence and lack of testamentary ca-
pacity is more concerned with fact than with law. The law is relatively
68. See Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 187-88.
69. Gary D. Zweifel, Jury Trials Come to Probate Courts of Georgia, 23 GA. B. J. 96, 96-97
(1986).
70. See generally, Doris Marie Provine, Persistent Anomaly: The Lay Judge in the American
Legal System, 6 JUST. SYS. J. 28 (1981). In the course of this article on the decreasing impor-
tance lay judges play in the American judiciary, Provine makes some interesting observations on
the equitable elements that lay judges, like juries, bring to the justice system in contradistinction
to the law-mindedness of legally-educated judges.
Provine notes, for example, that "the assumption that lay persons and lawyers think differ-
ently in ways relevant to adjudication has been prevalent for generations in literature . . . ." Id.
at 31-32. Furthermore, "the assumption that lay persons and lawyers bring different perspectives
to adjudication reserves its fullest institutional expression in the jury ...."Id. at 32.
Provine then quotes jury expert Harry Kalven, Jr.: "'The judge and jury are two remarkably
different institutions for reaching the same objective--fair, impersonal adjudication of contro-
versies. The judge represents tradition, discipline, professional competence and repeated experi-
ence with the matter .... But the endless fascination of the jury is to see whether something
quite different--the layman amateur drawn from a wide public disciplined only by the trial proc-
ess, and by an obligation to reach a group verdict-can somehow work as well or perhaps bet-
ter.'" Id. (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19
OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 178 (1958)).
Provine also looks to Broeder, noting that "'while it is generally recognized that juries often
return verdicts contrary to law, we cannot be sure whether this results from conscious law-
dispensing or pure bungling."' Id. at 38 (quoting Dale Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or
Fiction?, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 386, 412 (1954)). She observes that Holmes did not mind the mys-
tery of jury verdicts, because their verdicts are in large part a result of "popular prejudice ...
[keeping] the administration of the law in accord with the wishes and feelings of the commu-
nity." Id. Thus, as Provine herself puts it, "ITIhe jury provides the necessary antidote to too
much law in adjudication." Id. Provine's conclusion is relevant to the central theme of this
article:
Some academics are intrigued with the possibility of avoiding the disadvantages
inherent in the zero-sum game of traditional courtroom conflict managed by
lawyers. Enthusiasm from them [and policy-makers concerned with reducing
congestion in the courts) has encouraged experimentation in alternative modes
of dispute resolution [which] share a commitment to informal, conciliatory
modes of decicion-making. Often lay persons play a prominent role in such ex-
periments as mediators and arbitrators. The considerable favor with which lay
participation is now viewed raises the obvious question of whether past experi-
ence contains lessons relevant to the future successes of lay-dominated dispute
resolution.
Id. at 40.
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easy to state, at least in a general way, and involves no technicalities be-
yond the comprehension of the average layperson. If this is true, then
would not six or twelve laypeople have a better sense of what is fair to the
parties than would a single judge? Juries have no vested interest either in
the administration of a court calendar or in judicial economy. They
come, they serve, they decide what makes sense, and they go. Presumably
their decisions impart the sense of the community as to what is a fair dis-
tribution of estate assets within the family.
Those who are opposed to jury trials will surely answer that the ju-
ries' sense of fairness focuses more on the disposition itself than on pro-
tecting a testator's intent as expressed in the will and, therefore, they will
concentrate more on fairness to the living than on fairness to the dead.
Although it may be true, this tendency is not necessarily offensive. In
fact, this orientation may make good sense. Even though a testator's de-
sires are undoubtedly important under our system, it has always been for
the community, through laws such as the elective shareP1 or through jury
verdicts,7 2 to provide checks on this deference to testamentary intent.
It is clearly not in the best interests of judicial economy for probate
judges to find wills invalid;7" therefore, the deck is inevitably stacked
against will contestants when judges alone make the decisions! 4 The
better alternative for both judges and judicial economy, however, would
be a settlement of a will contest by the parties, which obviates altogether
the need for a trial.
This argument for jury trials in will contests is not terribly popular at
present, given the widespread sentiment for reducing court congestion.
After all, as we have seen, the important court systems of CaliforniaP6 and
Massachusetts77 have decided to eliminate juries in probate matters.
However, according to Albert Alschuler, this move away from the jury
trial has taken place in a system that itself is not working properly:
71. See Disinheritance, supra note 2, at 2-3. See also American Children, supra note 2, at 406-
07.
72. See Appellate Court Research, supra note 36. See also Schoenblum, supra note 9, at 626-
27.
73. See Rosenfeld, supra note 4, at 187-88. See also Schoenblum, supra note 8, at 626-27.
74. But see Appellate Court Research, supra note 36. In research conducted by Kathryn
Colson, evidence was found that the probate judges' attempts at judicial economy may be failing.
A study of cases appealed during 1997 through 1998, involving undue influence and lack of
testamentary capacity, revealed that many of the judges' decisions for proponents were being
overturned on appeal.
75. Telephone Interview by Lara Zdravecky with Barbara Koll, Senior Attorney of Fulton
County Probate Court (July 20, 1998).
76. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 7200 (West 1991).
77. See supra note 21.
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The vanishing jury-might not be a cause for concern if increased settlements
reflected a more cooperative attitude on the part of civil litigants. Nevertheless,
current settlement rates do not reflect a kinder, gender, and less litigious
America. Instead, the near disappearance of the trial [and jury] is the product
of the government's failure to supply a basic social service, the impartial resolu-
tion of disputes. We have not witnessed an increase [of) involuntary settle-
ments against a background of adequate judicial services. Rather... [settle-
ments occur] because our trial system has become unworkable. The American
trial has been bludgeoned by lengthy delays, high attorneys' fees, discovery
wars-and the world's most extensive collection of cumbersome procedures.
78
In other words, although fewer jury trials may reduce the delays and
costs of the civil system, 79 this change may simply compound the gov-
ernment's failure to provide an adequate dispute resolution system, with-
out improving the quality of settlements. At the same time, not only is
the trial of will contests by probate court judges less formal, faster, and
less expensive than jury trials, but it is faster and less expensive than is
most other civil litigation. An experienced practitioner details the pre-
1986 situation in the Georgia probate courts as follows:
Most matters in the probate court have typically been handled, even when
contested, within two within two to three months. Often a good probate judge
could assist families to a resolution of the case through informal consultation
with the lawyers and with the families so that everyone felt they had had their
"day in court" and typically no one wanted to litigate the matter further....
For many years, new lawyers have been told ... that Georgia has one of the
"simplest" and "most efficient" probate court systems in the country. He or she
was reminded that lawyers in other states marveled at the informality and
speed of the typical administration of estates in Georgia.
80
The attorney in question was concerned that the right to a jury trial,
which was introduced in 1986, would mean that contested estates would
take at least a year to try in Georgia's larger counties.8" Perhaps, in part,
the informal old system was just a bit too "cozy" for the legislature to tol-
erate. Clearly, other states' probate trials were generally lengthier and
more formal than were those in pre-1986 Georgia. 2 One suspects that
such trials were lengthy and costly enough to induce settlements in will
contests that otherwise may have gone to trial.8 3
The notable battle waged in the New York County Surrogate's
78. Albert W. Alschuler, The Vanishing Civil Jury, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 5,6 (1990). See
also text accompanying supra notes 22 and 48.
79. See Appellate Court Research, supra note 36.
80. See Zweifel, supra note 69, at 98.
81. Id. at 98.
82. Id. at 96-98.
83. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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Court over the Johnson & Johnson fortune resulted in an extremely
costly settlement, which reached just before the jury was given the case.84
Although high costs might have forced settlements in other cases earlier
in the process, there was so much money involved in this case that the
dominant reason for settlement here seems to have been proponents' fear
of a jury verdict. As recounted by Professor John Langbein, a "meridess' s
claim of undue influence was brought by the Johnson children against a
will that left most of the elder Johnson's assets under the control of his
relatively young second wife. Langbein seems at first to blame what he
considered an unjust settlement in favor of the children on the fact that
the children had a right to a jury trial. He cites Leon Jaworski's comment
that "the average jury is visited with a strong temptation to rewrite [the
will] in accordance with the jury's idea of what is fair and right.'"6 This
tendency, according to Langbein "place[s] testamentary freedom at risk"
and causes the proponents to settle!'
With this said, Langbein proceeds to undermine his own distaste for
the civil jury in will contests by attacking (after Margolick)8 the behavior
of the judge, Surrogate Marie Lambert. After lambasting Judge Lambert
for her favoritism toward the Johnson children (in both her conduct of
the trial and instructions she was prepared to give to the jury), Langbein
notes that "Americans can only look with envy to the esteemed and
meritocratic chancery bench that conducts probate jurisdiction in Erg-
lish and Commonwealth jurisdictions. '
One is left with several questions concerning the apparent contra-
dictions in Langbein's argument. Would Langbein, like the above-quoted
Georgia attorney, prefer to leave matters in the hands of probate judges
like Marie Lambert without the check of the civil jury? Given that
Americans are unlikely to change their largely political methods of se-
lecting probate judges and choose a bench like that in England and the
Commonwealth, are we not better off with a jury system in probate ccn-
tests? Although jury trials would be longer and more expensive than
would those decided by judges, is not the necessary corollary to Lang-
84. See DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 3, at 181-93. See also DAVID MARGOLICK,
UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE EPiC BAT-LE FOR THE JOHNSON & JOHNSON FORTUNE, Part 3, The
Trial, at 399-599 (1993).
85. John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2043 (1994) (book review).
86. See id. at 2043, n.10, quoting Leon Jaworski, The Will Contest, 10 BAYLOR L. REV. 87, 88
(1958).
87. Langbein, supra note 85, at 2043.
88. See id. at 2044; See, e.g., MARGOLICK, supra note 84, at 313, 407, 424, 459, 479, 486,
494, 523-24, 546-47, 550, 564, 576, 585.
89. Langbein, supra note 85, at 2044.
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bein's complaints about probate judges that higher quality decision mak-
ing may occur with the use of juries?
To be certain, settlements of will contests do occur given the antii-
pated delays and costs associated with trials, particularly jury trials. Be-
cause most probate systems take longer to try will contests than was ap-
parently the case in pre-1986 Georgia,9' bad settlements may result from
the lack of the necessary resources to try such cases more quickly?' Set-
dement for the wrong reasons may produce neither just results nor true
family reconciliations. What then is the alternative? Does the jury trial
improve the situation or make it worse?
As a prominent judge recently wrote, "I am convinced that collec-
tively the jury is better able to decide the case in a manner consistent
with community standards and values than is the judge." 2 Professor
George Priest supports this position by approving the work of the Univer-
sity of Chicago Jury Project led by Harry Kalven, Jr., and Hans Zeisel,
noting "the authors claimed that the civil jury was a superior institution
for adjudicating disputes involving complex societal values, that the jury
serves as an important instrument of popular control over law enforce-
ment, and that the jury brought a superior sense of social equity to the
decision-making process." ' However, the jury trial takes longer-4 and is
more expensive than is the judge-decided trial, so does not this fact po-
tentially lead to even "worse" settlements (i.e., coerced) than would trials
by judge?
This quandary was resolved in an interesting way in Fulton County,
Georgia. Two years after the introduction of probate jury trials in 1986,
the court developed a process of referring virtually all contested matters
to mediation. Whether this resulted from pressure from a probate bar
inexperienced in conducting full-fledged jury trials95 or from a sense that
the strength of the informal system could best be continued by using a
mediator rather than judge-or both,-the new system has been suc-
cessful in settling sixty-seven percent of contested matters brought on
undue influence and capacity grounds?6 Although the pressures induced
90. See generally Zweifel, supra note 69.
91. See generally Alschuler, supra note 78.
92. Prentice H. Marshall, A View from the Bench: Practical Perspectives on Juries, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 147, 158 (1990).
93. George L. Priest, The Role of the Civil Jury in a System of Private Litigation, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 161, 162 (1990). See also HARRY KALVEN, JR., & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY
(Little, Brown, & Co. 1966); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055
(1964).
94. See Priest, supra note 93, at 193.
95. See Zweifel, supra note 69, at 97.
96. Research conducted by Lara Zdravecky in July 1998 revealed that the Fulton County
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by longer, more formal, and more expensive jury trials may have pro-
duced this settlement rate, it is probable that the quality of such settle-
ments has been improved by taking them away from probate judges with
their vested interests in upholding wills and giving them to impartial ne-
diators with no such interests and without ultimate decision-making
power.
IV. ROUINE MEDIATION WITH JURY TRIALS AS AN
ALTERNATIVE
The right to a jury trial is best used in a system that attempts ADR
first. Will contestants in Atlanta's system have a right to a jury trial as an
alternative if mediation fails.97 The judge in Fulton County seldom rules
Probate Court decided 36 cases involving will contests between 1995 and 1997. In the majority
of these cases, wills were contested on grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary
capacity. In some instances, undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity were coupled
with allegations of fraud, faulty execution, and various other grounds for the contest of a will.
Of the 36 cases examined, 24 were settled in mediation. The bases for the will contests in each
of the settled cases are as follows: one for undue influence solely; one for undue influence cou-
pled with fraud; one for undue influence and fraud with a claim of a child being omitted from
the will in question; one for undue influence with the claim of an incomplete petition; 13 for
undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity; two for undue influence and lack of testa-
mentary capacity with fraud; three solely for lack of testamentary capacity; and two for lack of
testamentary capacity and fraud. See also Fulton County Probate Court Research, supra notes 29
and 45.
97. Telephone Interview by Lara Zdravecky with Barbara Koll, Senior Attorney of Fulton
County Probate Court (July 20, 1998). See also Fulton County Probate Court Research, supra
note 29. In the Fulton County Probate Court, the parties are first required to make a court
appearance. At this appearance, the judge may order the parties to dispose of the case through
mediation. If there is an objection to the judge's order, counsel must convince the judge that
attempted settlement of the case through mediation would be inappropriate. Although they are
required to make an appearance and an attempt at mediation, the parties are not obligated to
reach a settlement. The option of a trial, by either bench or jury, is always available to the
parties. Fulton County is one of the few counties in Georgia which permits parties to request
jury trials in probate matters. (Counties such as neighboring Forsyth County do not allow a jury
trial in probate matters, unless the case in question is tried de novo in the superior court.) If an
agreement is reached during mediation, the parties are required to present the agreement to the
probate judge for approval. Once the settlement agreement is approved, the parties proceed in
accordance with the provisions specified in the mediation agreement.
If no agreement is reached during mediation, the parties are permitted to either request a jury
trial or continue with a bench trial. Once the case goes to trial, the parties proceed just as they
would in a full evidentiary trial. The contestant has the burden of proof. The trial begins with
opening arguments, the presentation of evidence in the form of direct examination and cross
examination of the witnesses, closing arguments, and then briefs from the attorneys on certain
points of law.
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from the bench. Upon receiving a judgment, the parties must abide by
the court's order or appeal. A trial by jury follows a very similar pattern,
with the addition of jury selection and deliberations by the jury after n-
struction from the judge on matters of law. Proponents of a will may be
concerned that the jury, because of its sense of social equity, may be more
willing to decide against them than would a judge and that a jury's der-
sion will be more costly in time and money than would that of a judge.
As a result, proponents may be more likely to settle. This system places
the will contestants on a more even footing than does a system without
the jury trial; however, the disincentives of cost and delay will remain to
induce them to settle. Even if settlement fails, the typical civil jury may
still be a more "just" decider of will contests than is the typical probate
judge sitting alone.
Although judges certainly bring discretion and equitable decision
making to bear when adjudicating will contests, they are still more con-
scious of preserving the law of the matter than are juries: juries may focus
more on fair (natural) distribution of the estate than on the preservation
of a dead person's (theoretical) intent. In addition, juries will not impose
a stringent notion of what influence might be undue or what degree of
mental weakness may rise to the level of incapacity. Instead, they may
reason backward. Jurors may collectively feel that if a testator left prcp-
erty in an unnatural manner, he or she must have been crazy, or under
undue influence, or both. Even if this is the way many such verdicts are
reached, the results are sound because good decision making in these
cases should be, to paraphrase Holmes, more the product of experience
than of logic.9"
Furthermore, the law is relatively unimportant in cases of undue
influence and incapacity. These matters are fact specific. Thus, if juries
decide them on a case-by-case basis, applying their common sense of
right and wrong, we are not "losing much" legally. Like mediated cases,
little "law" follows from such decisions; they are of little or no preceda-
tal value if tried. If jury verdicts result in flexible concepts of incapacity
and undue influence, so what? Is not "law" in the sense of rules derived
from precedents far more important in areas such as securities regulations
and commercial contracts than it is in will contests?
Like the jury trial, mediation focuses more on the proper distribution
of the estate than on abstract (and vague) legal principles. The family in
mediation, like the community in a jury trial, imposes its ideas of natural-
ness and fairness, using such factors as relative degrees of kinship of the
98. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Neill H. Alford, Jr. LL.B.,
S.S.D., et al. eds., The Legal Classics Library 1982).
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contending parties, notions of parental obligation, and the actual per-
sonal closeness of potential legatees to the testator.
One difference, however, is that the jury decides the matter. A me-
diator simply attempts to get the parties to a position where they can de-
cide what is just. Parties in mediation are invested in and must live with
the decision, unlike the civil jury, which can impose judgment and then
walk away. For this reason, mediation is preferable to the jury. However,
the potential to contest a will before a jury that will decide for the parties
presents a viable second choice if mediation fails.
If routine or mandatory mediation is the keystone to an improved
system for will contests, how does it work in practice? In the next section,
I shall address this issue by first discussing the mediation form of ADR in
general and then focus upon how it works in practice, primarily in Fulton
County Georgia, and secondly in Hawaii and Oregon.
V. MEDIATION AS A MEANS OF RESOLVING CONFLICT IN WILL
CONTESTS
A. In General
ADR is employed in lieu of litigation in a myriad of legal situa-
tions. In part, it is a response to the frustration individuals feel when
involved in the traditional hostile route of litigation, where the proc-
ess is lengthy, the financial and emotional costs are enormous, and
decisions rendered do not entirely reflect each participant's view of
fairness.
Traditionally, ADR encompasses many models of dispute resolu-
tion including mediation, negotiation, arbitration, and conciliation.
The various forms of ADR are quite distinct. For example, in arbitra-
tion, the neutral arbitrator submits a decision that is binding on the
parties. In mediation, the parties must actively participate to reach a
solution themselves. Although each type of ADR is unique, all seek to
reach a result through a process that each party perceives as equitable.
B. The Procedure for a Typical Mediation Session
Mediation is a form of ADR that presents a valuable alternative to
litigation in will contests and is an excellent mechanism for resolving
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conflict between feuding parties." The typical mediation session consists
of three main stages: the opening stage; the private caucuses; and moder-
ated negotiations. ° The opening stage is the first formal stage of the ses-
sion and sometimes is referred to as the joint session.' This is the stage
at which preliminary matters are addressed, such as who will attend the
sessions, how the parties should prepare, and whether counsel will cm-
tinue to attend with the parties.' 2 In cases involving family matters, such
as a will contest, parties may not attend with counsel. 3 Once the parties
are all together, the mediator explains the process and rules. The opening
stage is an opportunity for the parties to gain confidence in and build
rapport with the mediator. 4 If the parties' attorneys are present, they
argue the merits of their case directly to the other side; meanwhile, the
parties have an opportunity to vent their emotions, frustrations, and
anxieties in front of the each other.0" The opening stage is also very im-
portant for the mediator because it allows him or her to gain insight as to
what issues are blocking an agreement.0 6
Once the opening stage is completed and all of the preliminary
matters have been addressed, the parties can separate into private cau-
cuses with the mediator. The mediator talks confidentially with each
party and counsel (if present) to try to move toward an agreement.0 '
99. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 21 1B § 19 (1992) (this statute enables civil actions, including
probate and family disputes, to be referred to non-binding mediation by the trial court where the
dispute originated under the rules established by the chief administrative judge).
100. See DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES, EFFECTIVE STRATEGIES FOR
LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS 61 (1996).
101. See id. at 62.
102. See JAMES E. GRUMBACH ET AL., ANATOMY OF A MEDIATION, MOCK MEDIATION
VIGNETTES, PLUS ANALYSIS, PRACTICE, TIPS, AND DISCUSSIONS 77 (1997).
103. See id. at 78.
104. See GOLANN, supra note 100, at 62.
105. See id. at 63.
106. See id. In its opening stage, the goals of mediation are as follows: (1) to introduce the
mediator to the parties and counsel; (2) to explain the procedure to the participants; (3) to
expose both sides to the merits of the dispute; (4) to provide an arena for the participants to
vent their emotions and frustration; (5) to provide an avenue for the transfer of control from the
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107. See id. at 68. The goals in the second round, or private caucuses, shifts to some extent
from those in the opening stage. The mediator now needs to gather sensitive information that
may not come out in joint sessions. If necessary to reach an agreement, the mediator may fa-
cilitate the venting of emotions if that has not already occurred. It is in this second round that
the mediator must probe for the obstacle that may be blocking settlement. Once identified, the
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this is necessary if the parties are to move forward with the dispute resolution. Each party's
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These private caucuses create an atmosphere in which the parties can
share sensitive information, which they may be uncomfortable raising
before one another."' 8 This stage is another step in the process of building
trust between the party and the mediator; it allows each party to talk
directly to the mediator in a more comfortable environment." 9 Mediators
usually have to move back and forth between the sides at this juncture,
employing what is often called shuttle diplomacy."1 However, in family
situations such as the will contest, mediators usually employ this method
as little as possible, striving to keep the parties in joint sessions as much as
possible."'
Sometimes an agreement can be reached during the private cau-
cuses, in which case, the last step would be to have counsel approve the
agreement." 2 If an agreement is not reached after this second stage, then
the parties move into the moderated negotiations stage." 3 In this stage,
the parties are brought back together, after the caucuses, to work out an
agreement in a joint session. The mediator is present to facilitate, not to
impose any type of agreement on the parties. 4 The mediator may offer
possible solutions but the agreement must be that of the parties.
Once an agreement has been reached, the mediation process is over
and the parties can move on to carrying out the agreement. The length
and number of mediation sessions depend on the parties and the conflict
involved.
In summary, mediation is a voluntary, systematic process of dispute
resolution in which a neutral third party facilitates communication so
that the participants can resolve their conflict in a manner that they be-
lieve is just. This form of dispute resolution helps to encourage the family
harmony that traditional litigation so often destroys. Because will con-
tests are often highly polemical and involve sensitive emotional issues
position and priorities must be established in order to make an attempt at a settlement more
realistic. Before the mediator can proceed with such goals, she must build a trust with the par-
ticipants. See id. at 68-7 1.
108. See id. at 69.
109. See GOLANN, supra note 100, at 69.
110. See id. at 68.
111. See id.
112. See GRUMBACH, supra note 102, at 78.
113. See GOLANN, supra note 100, at 81-84. The mediator's goal at this point is to push for
closure and have the parties commit the deal to writing. The mediator still is serving as a referee
and not forcing an agreement. Usually, the parties just need to work out a few minor complica-
tions at this point. The mediator wants to encourage constructive negotiations and lead the
parties down the path which is going to result in a settlement and not allow them to veer from
the ultimate goal of the session. See id.
114. See id.
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that are unlikely to be diffused through litigation, mediation programs
may be more critical in this area than in other areas of law. "For many
families, inheritance is not merely a matter of intergenerational transfer
of wealth. It is also a matter of conflict."
'' 5
Professor Susan Gary confirms that litigation is not always the most
appropriate means of resolving will contests. She suggests that, because
probate disputes are inherently volatile and emotionally charged, media-
tion provides a milieu in which feuding parties can verbalize their con-
cerns in a less openly hostile fashion." 6
Gary argues that probate disputes often encompass concerns that are
unique and, therefore, call for a forum for resolution that is unique. For
example, disputing parties often have disparate views of fairness. One
sibling may believe that the decedent's estate should be divided equally
among siblings. Conversely, another sibling may believe that because he
took care of the decedent prior to death, a "fair" solution would include
his receiving a bigger chunk of the decedent's pie. Gary observes:
[A] t some level, pure greed may generate conflict ... However, beyond the
simple desire for economic benefit, survivors may not want or feel entitled to a
'fair' and equitable distribution, regardless of the amount involved. This desire
for fairness breeds conflict if family members have different views of what a fair
distribution of the decedent's property should be."
17
Other sources of conflict between family members embroiled in pro-
bate disputes include the following situations: (1) those in which, because
of the types of property involved, "estates are not easily divisible into
equal shares;"'" 8 (2) those in which a beneficiary may not receive what he
or she believes reflects his or her status within the family;' and (3) those
in which lack of communication rather than the actions taken, may be at
the center of the conflict. 12°
Of the numerous advantages of mediating will contests, Gary
stresses mediation's ability to "repair, maintain, or improve ongoing rela-
tionships[.] [This facet] is of particular importance in resolving family
disputes.' 12' The emotionally-charged atmosphere following the death of
115. Sandra L. Titus et al., Family Conflict over Inheritance of Property, 28 FAM.
COORDINATOR 337, 337 (1979), quoted in Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: Using Me-
diation to Resolve Probate Disputes Over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
397, 415 (1997).
116. See Gary, supra note 115, at 415.
117. Id. at416-17.
118. Id. at417.
119. Seeid. at 421.
120. See id. at 422.
121. Gary, supra note 115, at 428.
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a loved one can exacerbate the existing strife within a family and evenu-
ally drive family members apart. Mediation helps to abate the conflict by
having the parties work together to reach a solution. This joint invest-
ment in the settlement makes its faithful execution more likely than
might be the case under other forms of dispute resolution.
In contrast, litigation "encourages parties to become entrenched in
their positions and to view a successful outcome as a win for one party
and a loss for the other." 2 This "zero sum game"" rules out the win-win
outcomes possible with mediation. In addition, litigation inhibits can-
munication about anything other than the legal issue at stake."
Scholars are not alone in arguing that mediation is a welcome
mechanism for resolving probate disputes. For example, Attorney
Dominic Campisi notes that "[m] any probate disputes involve a history
of the failure of family members to express anger or resentments toward
the deceased or other relatives."" Consequently, he suggests that, to
resolve these disputes, "one must understand the grieving process, family
dynamics, the need for a forum to express resentment, refusal of family
members to accept termination of the family and their preference for
continued conflict rather than abandonment, and timing of settlements
within these processes."'2 6 Mediation, according to Campisi, addresses all
of these issues. 12 Campisi's sentiments in favor of mediation are echoed
by David Dorfman, an experienced New York City estate litigator.'2 Fi-
nally, a mediator with the Justice Center of Atlanta writes as follows:
[Tiwo factors common to other types of mediation I've done, are common to
probate mediation as well. They are that wounded feelings and lack of commu-
nication between the parties are more of a barrier to the resolution of the dis-
pute than are the actual money concerns. I.have found that simply having the
interested parties together in the same room to communicate direcdy may
• . i . 129
lower these barriers.
C. Benefits of Mediation
As mentioned, several aspects of mediation make it a unique and
122. Id. at 429.
123. See, e.g., LESTER THUROW, THE ZERO SUM SOCIETY (1980).
124. See Gary, supra note 110, at 429.
125. Dominic J. Campisi, Using ADR in Property and Probate Disputes, PROB. & PROP.,
May/June 1995, at 48, 52.
126. Id. at 48.
127. See id. at 53.
128. See Dorfman Interview, supra note 22.
129. Dan Gulden, A Sampling of Common Situations in Probate Mediation Cases, THE CAUCUS
(Justice Center of Atlanta, Inc., Atlanta, Ga.), Feb. 1992.
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efficacious alternative to litigation. One salient feature of mediation is
that it is a purely voluntary proceeding. To engage in mediation, both
parties to a dispute must agree that it would be an appropriate method of
resolving their issues. In addition, the mediation proceeding is private
and confidential. Mediation takes into consideration the fact that most
families do not want to "air their dirty laundry" in open court. Conse-
quently, the setting provides the impetus for open communication be-
tween family members without fear that everyone will know what is going
on in the family.
31
A recent Supreme Judicial Court Report on ADR in the Massachu-
setts courts emphasized several noteworthy advantages of mediation.3
First, mediation empowers the parties involved, because they play an
active role in devising a solution for their own dispute. The parties, who
likely believe that their voices are marginalized in the judicial process,
need not rely on their attorneys to make often futile attempts at diffusing
the anger and grief that are ubiquitous in probate disputes. Instead, the
individuals involved retain control over the outcome of the case. For this
reason, the parties are more likely to be satisfied with the result than are
individuals whose solution has been dictated to them.
Second, because many of the individuals involved in probate issues
want to maintain ongoing relationships with family members, friends,
caregivers, and the like, the process of mediation contains techniques
designed to preserve existing relationships by: (1) emphasizing the im-
portance of communication; and (2) teaching people new ways to deal
with potential future conflicts.
132
The third benefit of mediation is the avoidance of the considerable
costs of litigation,133 including attorney's fees and court costs. Delay itself
involves financial (as well as emotional ) costs; by using mediation, a case
can often be resolved much more quickly than it could be using the liti-
gation process. Although a will contest could feasibly drag on for years in
the courts, settlement may be reached in a few sessions through the me-
•diation process.
130. See Gary, supra note 115, at 424-25.
131. See Report of the Supreme Judicial Court/Trial Court Standing Committee on Dispute
Resolution, Dispute Resolution in the Courts: A Plan to Promote Access, Choice, and Integity in
Court-Connected Dispute Resolution (June 18, 1996).
132. Gary, supra note 115, at 428.
133. See Jonathan W. Reitman, What Every Successful Bar Applicant Should Know About Alter-
native Dispute Resolution, 67 THE BAR EXAMINER 23, 25 (Feb. 1998).
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D. Where ADR Is Being Used and Where Should It Be Used
Surprisingly, court-based ADR programs are still in their infancy,
particularly in the probate court. Despite their potential for success, sur-
prisingly few formal ADR programs are underway in the probate courts
nationwide. Among the most notable of these programs have been those
established in the court system of Fulton County, Georgia, and in Hawaii
and Oregon.
In 1990, the probate court in Atlanta, Georgia began ordering par-
ties in the majority of disputes to mediation. To date, more than 600
cases from the Fulton County Probate Court have been referred to its
mediation program, which boasts a sixty-five percent settlement rate.'34
Barbara Koll, a senior staff attorney in the probate court, reiterates the
benefits of mediation over litigation. She confirms that it is a common
misconception that probate court proceedings primarily relate to more-
tary issues. In fact, Koll asserts that money is secondary to the emotional
concerns of the parties involved.'35 In addressing the advantages of me-
diation, Koll claims that disputing family members feel better about the
negotiated settlements achieved through mediation than they do about
court-imposed decisions.
In Hawaii, ADR programs have been adopted at each level of court
and have been integrated into the court process through the promulga-
tion of procedural rules. 36 For instance, circuit court rules mandate that
there be a settlement conference in every civil action thirty days before
trial. During this conference, the judge can suggest mediation as an al-
ternative to trial.
137
According to Chief Justice Ronald Moon of the Hawaii Supreme
Court, that state's circuit court has considered requiring attorneys to dis-
cuss ADR as an option for the parties. If the parties choose not to pro-
ceed with mediation, they would then have to sign a statement setting
forth why they believe that a trial would be a better alternative. 38
Chief Justice Moon is a staunch supporter of Hawaii's court-based
ADR program. He contends that using mediation in probate matters
134. See Koll Interview, supra note 46.
135. See Barbara Koll, Mediation in the Fulton County Probate Court 7.3 (Mar. 1, 1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
136. See Ronald T.Y. Moon, Visions of a New Legal System: Could There Be a Legal System that
Better Incorporates the Strengths of ADR and Existing Legal Institutions?, 15 REV. LITIO. 475, 476-
77 (1996).
137. See id. at 477.
138. See id. at 479.
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effectively addresses the problems encountered in litigation by providing
a forum in which families can attend to the emotional aspects of their
dispute. To this end, a task force was assembled to develop a court-based
ADR program primarily to address probate and trust disputes.'39
The courts in Hawaii are so serious about ADR that if the court re-
fers a case to mediation either on its own motion or that of one of the
parties, participation is mandatory.1"° Similarly, if the parties or the attor-
neys fail to abide by the mediation rules, the court can impose
sanctions.14 Hawaii's model demonstrates that courts can oversee court-
based ADR programs and that ADR methods can also be integrated into
the litigation process itself.
142
Although Oregon's courts can also order mandatory mediation, this
option is rarely exercised.143 Parties are only encouraged to attend me-
diation proceedings; even this often leads to settlement. Recognizing that
some disputes in probate court involve more financial issues but others
are noticeably more personal in nature, two panels of mediators have
been established in Oregon counties. One panel contains mediators who
are well versed in financial matters. The other panel contains mediators
who are better equipped to deal with emotional issues.'"
Although, at present, ADR programs are only infrequently available
in probate disputes nationwide, a number of jurisdictions are in the proc-
ess of integrating ADR into their court systems as a whole. Middlesex
County, in Massachusetts, has recently introduced the Middlesex Multi-
Door Courthouse ("MMDC"), which is a program that sponsors several
alternatives to litigation. The program director, Barbara Stedman, ex-
plains that cases are sent to mediation by a number of sources including
judges, attorneys, and parties. 4 Stedman emphasizes the fact that suc-
cess of mediation often depends on the acquiescence of both sides."*
However, mediation may be ordered by some judges at the pretrial con-
ference, even if the parties are reluctant. Stedman indicated that she saw
no reason not to use mediation in probate disputes, although this use had
not yet been formally attempted under the MMDC program.
47
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140. See Gary, supra note 115, at 435.
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Stedman also notes that the MMDC model emanated from public
concern over the problem of congestion in the court system, individuals'
lack of faith in the judicial system, and the recognition that "adjudication
alone could not adequately accommodate the wide range of disputes and
disputants seeking assistance in the courts.""' The MMDC program is
based on the assertion that "the ideal courthouse of the future would
serve as a dispute resolution center."149 Stedman envisions a court system
composed of two units: a screening (intake) unit to assess the situation
and a unit consisting of the various ADR forums. Once the screening
process has been completed, the MMDC program also takes into account
the qualifications of the neutral mediators, the composition of the panels,
ADR options, and program evaluations. 5 '
Since its inception in 1990, the MMDC program has progressively
gained acceptance. However, despite the growing use of ADR in Massa-
chusetts, the MMDC and similar programs have not yet been completely
merged into the state's court system and are not being used formally in
the probate courts.
E. Incorporating ADR into Existing Probate Court Systems: Pros and Cons
Gary proposes several recommendations for developing successful
ADR programs in probate so that they may become more widespread.
She urges that more mediators be trained, particularly in the vocabulary
and issues of probate cases."' She notes that mediation is especially suc-
cessful in situations in which the following characteristics are present: (1)
the parties would benefit from an ongoing relationship; (2) the parties are
willing to participate; (3) the parties are competent to mediate; (4) the
parties desire confidentiality; (5) the dispute involves nonlegal as well as
legal issues; and (6) the power imbalances are minimal.'52
In contrast to Gary's specific enumerations of the issues, Stedman
addresses the overall problem of institutionalizing ADR programs in the
courts. Stedman identifies the need to provide an initial assessment of
the requirements of a particular court system. This assessment could be
accomplished by creating committees to set realistic goals." 3
Stedman also poses questions that must be considered before ADR
148. BARBARA EPSTEIN STEDMAN, THE MIDDLESEX MULTI-DOOR COURTHOUSE: A MODEL
FOR COMPREHENSIVE ADR SERVICES 1 (1996).
149. Id. at 2.
150. See id. at 3.
151. See Gary, supra note 115, at 438.
152. See id. at 441-44.
153. See Stedman Interview, supra note 145.
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programs are established. "Who will sponsor the program?" "What types
of cases should the program handle?" "Which ADR options will be pro-
vided?" "Under what authority will the program operate?" "How are the
neutral panels selected and supervised?"' 54
Despite its advantages, mediation may not be suitable for all probate
disputes. 55 As Gary asserts, grief may play an active role in the probate
dispute itself. Consequently, mediation may be no better for a grieving
party than litigation if that party is still grieving while attempting to me-
diate the dispute. Another issue to be considered is the length of the dis-
pute. Mediation may not be suitable in cases in which open conflict has
been ongoing in a family for a number of years before the death of the
decedent. As a final point, if there is an imbalance of power between the
feuding parties, this may impair the mediator's ability to guide the parties
toward an equitable settlement. Even the most capable mediator may not
be able to defeat years of domination by one individual over another.
In addition to the few theoretical negatives of routine mediation,
there are also some practical difficulties. In our study, full-blown will
contests involving testamentary capacity and undue influence accounted
for only thirty-one of eighty-two cases appealed during one year.'56 The
other cases involved various procedural issues or doctrines of faulty exe-
cution or revocation; one was a quantum meruit claim. Thirty-one cases
nationwide, over a period of a year, is perhaps too few to draw the atten-
tion of those advocating mediation.
However, it is probable that numerous capacity and undue influence
cases nationwide during that single year were decided by a probate court
or jury and not appealed. One suspects that the number of these cases is
considerably higher than those that were appealed. Assuming this to be
the case, there would certainly be enough undue influence and capacity
cases nationwide to mandate implementation of some sort of mediation
system.
Another issue is that, in some cases, courts will not want to refer
cases to mediation. For example, research indicates that a single judge in
Suffolk County, Massachusetts handles most, if not all, probate matters
and that such specialization also occurs in the huge Middlesex County,
Massachusetts.'57 It is not clear whether specialized judges would support
154. See STEDMAN, supra note 148.
155. See Gary, supra note 115, at 440.
156. See Appellate Court Research, supra note 36. [One additional case found insane delu-
sion, an offshoot of the capacity doctrine, in the execution of the contestant's (not proponent's)
proffered alternative will.]
157. Conversation of the author with Tracey Bulger, March, 1998, regarding her research at
Suffolk County Probate Court.
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sending their cases to mediation. I am reminded of a conversation I had
some years ago with the then Chief Judge of Probate in Plymouth
County, Massachusetts, James R. Lawton. I asked Judge Lawton if I could
bring members of my Wills class to his courtroom to view a will contest,
and he responded that he would love to have a will contest---that nearly
all of his business involved divorce and custody matters.5
An educated guess, then, would be that, at least in Massachusetts,
the few probate judges that actually hear will contests (and then only
sporadically) have no particular interest in farming such cases out to me-
diation. The problem, of course, is that when they do hear these cases,
they almost always find for the proponent.
If the answer to the problems associated with probate disputes is a
systemwide policy of referral to mediation, legislation may be required. As
discussed, Hawaii and Oregon have taken serious steps to include will
contests in their ADR programs'59 and Oregon has taken the further step
of creating two types panels for such mediation." This approach recog-
nizes that, although probate disputes do involve emotional issues, they
may also involve more technical issues. It may be that existing mediation
panels, such as that in Middlesex County, Massachusetts, are ill-equipped
to handle probate matters when they involve technical and financial is-
sues in addition to emotional ones.
Despite these concerns, ADR programs, particularly mediation,
would be a worthy addition to the justice system in general and the pro-
bate courts in particular. ADR can help minimize the congestion in our
courts while simultaneously helping to reconcile families. The following
passage summarizes why we should turn more frequently to ADR to set-
tle our disputes, including will contests:
Too often litigation plans consist of reacting to the other side through a routine
pattern of document discovery, fact witness depositions and (un)dispositive
motions. Full atterftion comes only as deadlines for experts and trial force the
case to the front of a litigator's desk. Early assignment to ADR provides guid-
ance to the parties on the crucial disputes and uncertainties that bar settlement
and forces them to resolve those issues in a timely fashion. The process should
isolate the issues, force the parties to investigate the facts or seek resolution or
clarification of the legal question, and then return reasonably quickly to re-
evaluate their positions.'
6'
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VI. CONCLUSION: NON-LAWYER DECISION MAKING MAKES
SENSE IN WILL CONTESTS
However well probate judges may "move will contests along," they
may appear to, on the whole, sacrifice justice in doing so, given their
marked propensity to find for will proponents. In contrast, trial by jury
provides will contestants a much better chance of winning. Thus, a pro-
bate court system that offers both alternatives for trying cases seems to be
the fairest solution.
Regardless of how well the right to trial by jury may "level the play-
ing field" between proponent and contestant, it must be admitted that
jury trials are typically lengthier and more costly than are bench trials. In
addition, there is always the -possibility of numerous reversals by the ap-
pellate courts, particularly of jury verdicts for contestants. 62 Such rever-
sals are costly for the litigants as well as for the court system itself. How-
ever, my nationwide analysis shows that a number of judges' decisions for
proponents are themselves being reversed for contestants. 63 Perhaps it is
not too much to conclude that appellate courts in will contests are quite
vigilant in policing judges' overwhelming predilection to decide for pro-
ponents as well as juries' somewhat milder tendencies to find for contest-
ants. If this is the case, the system for finally deciding will contests will
remain costly and slow, regardless of whether judges or juries make the
initial decision.
The disagreements between judges and juries as to whether a given
case shows lack of testamentary capacity or undue influence begin with
the doctrines themselves. These are vague doctrines, the requirements of
which really call for case-by-case factual analysis. In many cases, such
analysis may be better done by juries than by judges, because juries ap-
pear to focus on what seems most important: who among competing
legatees gets what and whether this distribution is just. Because the law
muddles this determination by emphasizing the undue influence and lack
of testamentary capacity doctrines' mandate to find the true intent of the
testator regardless of the justice of the disposition, judges may well be
focused more on what the dead testator actually wanted than are juries.
While testamentary intent is relevant to the ultimate distribution of the
estate, this inquiry is less compelling than is the apparent emphasis that
juries put on the fairness of the distribution itself.
One can certainly quarrel with my preference for outcome-based
162. See text accompanying supra note 52.
163. See text accompanying supra note 38.
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jury verdicts over judicial decisions that protect the "dead hand." The
judicial system's confusion as to which direction it should take in cases of
undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity may be based on a
conflict between the lay and legal views of what is really important to
decide. What better breech for mediation to step into than one in which
the system is at war with itself.
Mediation often brings if not a lay, then at least a non-lawyer's per-
spective to bear on the family crisis of a will contest. It does so in a way
that enables the parties to reach a result in which each has an invest-
ment. Given the emotional dimensions of the typical will contest, the
skillful mediator may enable the parties to find win-win solutions as an
alternative to submitting to judicial win lose decisions, which may further
rend the fabric of the family involved. In mediation, the family's sense of
what is just can be brought to bear in reaching the final decision.
The second-best method would be to have a jury impart the commu-
nity's sense of what a typical family might feel is fair. Although mediation
is preferable to a jury verdict, a jury verdict is preferable to a judicial at-
tempt at resolution that focuses in large on the state of mind of a dead
testator.
I believe the best system of resolving will contests involves routine
referral to mediation first, with the understanding that, if mediation fails,
the parties have the right to appear before either judge or jury. This sys-
tem works well in Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia and should work
equally well in other probate courts nationwide. Because law-trained in-
dividuals, be they attorneys or judges, may be loathe to surrender their
involvement in will contests and may actively resist such a change, the
public itself must push for this type of program. At the same time, those
lawyers who admit the superiority of the "mediation first" system can join
it, by training themselves in the techniques of mediation. Likewise, judges
may come to see the wisdom of letting mediators have "first crack" at
these emotional family matters; certainly, the system in place in Atlanta
saves judicial time and effort. In summary, law-trained individuals can
learn new tricks and mediation in will contests is one such trick; if
enough individuals are willing to learn how to mediate, a program like
that used in the Atlanta probate system can be instituted nationwide.

